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Response

Speaking of Silence:
A Reply to Making Defendants Speak
Donald P. Judges† and Stephen J. Cribari††
In an article recently appearing in the Minnesota Law Review, Ted Sampsell-Jones argues that defendants should be
“made” to testify at criminal trials.1 The article’s primary rationale is that defendants are an informational resource whose
testimony is necessary to the fact-finding process.2 The article
also proposes that defendants actually will benefit from the resulting diminution in defense counsel’s role at trial.3
The key move in Sampsell-Jones’s article is not directly to
challenge the norms underlying defendants’ rights, to which it
gives scant attention and minimal content. Rather, it is to argue that, because government “neutrality between testimony
and silence” is not possible, desirable, or constitutionally required,4 the question becomes “whether the current set of rules
† E.J. Ball Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Clinical Psychology at the University of Arkansas.
†† Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School and Visiting Professor of Law at the University of St. Thomas School of Law. The authors wish to thank Professors Stephen Sheppard and Brian Gallini for their
comments. Thanks also to Jason Auer and Aaron McClintock for their research assistance. Copyright © 2009 by Donald P. Judges and Stephen J. Cribari.
1. Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1327, 1329 (2009). For a similar analysis, see Jeffery Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules that Encourage Defendants to
Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 853 (2008).
2. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1330–34.
3. Id. at 1336.
4. Id. at 1327. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, the case cited in support of this
proposition, involved a habeas challenge to a higher sentence imposed by a
jury after a successful appeal. 412 U.S. 17 (1973). There the Court explicitly
reaffirmed “the underlying rationale” of North Carolina v. Pearce, that due
process prohibits the imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial “as punishment” for the exercise of the right of appeal or collateral review. See Chaffin,
412 U.S. at 18 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)). Chaffin
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creates the proper mix of incentives and disincentives” in a “zero-sum game” between the constitutional right to testify on one
side of the ledger and the constitutional right to remain silent
on the other.5 The article proposes two sets of reforms to “make
defendants speak.” To “punish” defendants more for refusing to
testify, it would overrule the prohibition, set out in Griffin v.
California,6 on adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence in
a criminal proceeding.7 To “reward” them for testifying, it proposes two measures. The first would abandon the five-factor balancing test of Gordon v. United States,8 which has guided admissibility under Rule 609(a)(1)9 of prior felony convictions as
impeachment evidence against defendants who testify in their
own criminal trials.10 The second would abolish perjury enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines’11 obstruction-ofjustice provision for defendants who testify falsely under
oath.12
Making Defendants Speak takes immediate aim at Griffin,
which it finds flawed as a matter of theory, constitutional text,
history, and policy; but its ultimate target is the right to remain silent at trial.13 We therefore concentrate most of our atdistinguishes between judicial and jury sentencing in addressing the risk of
vindictiveness because the Court saw the jury as presenting less risk, in part
because the jury is unlikely to be in a position to seek or to desire to punish a
defendant for the exercise of the right. See id. at 26–27. The Court did not endorse but instead explicitly rejected (once again) the proposition that the state
may deliberately seek to punish a defendant for exercising a constitutional
right. See id. at 35.
5. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1328.
6. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
7. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1339–58. Griffin held that the Fifth
Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” 380
U.S. at 615. Most sources, including the Supreme Court, refer to the Griffin
principle as a prohibition on adverse or negative inference from the defendant’s silence. E.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327–30 (1999). It
would be more correct grammatically to state the Griffin rule as a prohibition
on adverse implication rather than on adverse inference. Prosecutors and
judges imply (or are explicit), juries infer. The term “no-adverse-inference instruction to the jury” thus reflects correct usage. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450
U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (using the term). For the sake of convenience, however,
we simply adopt the more common terminology in referring broadly to Griffin.
8. 383 F.2d 936, 939–41 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
9. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
10. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1358–67.
11. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. N.4(b) (2008).
12. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1369–75.
13. Id. at 1347–49.
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tention on a robust right to remain silent at trial. In Part I we
argue that the right to remain silent at trial has emerged as
part of a cluster of rights effectuating the modern “test the
prosecution” approach to criminal procedure. The adverse inference, prohibited by Griffin, is inconsistent with that right. We
suggest in Part II that more may be said on behalf of a robust
right to silence, including a prohibition on adverse inferences,
than its critics recognize. Finally, we briefly respond in Part III
to several specific aspects of Making Defendants Speak. We
suggest that its “zero-sum-game” perspective reflects flawed
premises and reasoning and is more usefully regarded as a
form of “exchange abolitionism,” the notion underlying the
movement in England and Wales to permit adverse inferences
from the accused’s silence. We also point out some problems in
that article’s “accuracy,” “participation,” and “equity” arguments.
I. MAKING DEFENDANTS SPEAK AS HISTORICAL
CRITIQUE
Making Defendants Speak’s historical critique of Griffin
travels a well-worn path; and its challenge to Griffin’s reliance
on unconstitutional conditions doctrine is both dependent on
and undermined by its incentivization rationale. The article recites familiar originalist arguments about the historical meaning of “compulsion”—that adverse inference does not rise to the
level of “the racks and oaths forced by the power of law.”14 Griffin is wrong, this critique runs, because the adverse inference
was not a harm the Framers’ generation would have taken seriously.15 The implication of this position goes beyond Griffin to
embrace a minimalist interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
which largely excludes the right to remain silent. Albert Alschuler, for example, in proposing that the United States more
or less “follow England’s lead” and abandon both Griffin and
Miranda, has argued on both policy and historical grounds that
the United States Supreme Court went astray when it recognized a right to remain silent in the Fifth Amendment at all, as
opposed only to “a safeguard against torture and other forms of

14. Id. at 1347 n.106 (invoking the image of “[o]ur hardy forebears” (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 335 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
15. Id.
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coercive interrogation.”16 And it was only a matter of time before someone invoked the threat of terrorism alongside the historical critique in contending for a narrow interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment which would exclude Griffin.17
To us, the central problem is not situating Griffin in the
modern right to remain silent at trial. Griffin’s no-adverseinference rule is woven neatly into the fabric of that right. Rather, the problem is finding a robust right to remain silent in
the Fifth Amendment. In the absence of such a right, Griffin is
of course moot. If there is such a right, the adverse inference
prohibited by Griffin violates it directly—quite apart from the
“penalty” construct that opinion invokes and to which Making
Defendants Speak devotes so much energy attempting to refute—because through it the prosecution and judge in effect
will have transformed the defendant’s silence into evidence
against him.18 Griffin’s rule thus effectuates the Fifth Amendment not only because the adverse inference seeks to induce
forfeiture of the right to remain silent at trial, but also because
it seeks to employ the exercise of that right as implicit testimonial evidence against the accused. If the Fifth Amendment
contains a right to silence at trial, allowing an adverse inference is incompatible with that right.
Moreover, Making Defendants Speak is at odds with itself
even with respect to its incentivization paradigm. It criticizes
Griffin’s inference-as-penalty reasoning on the grounds that
16. Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The
Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2667–68 (1996). Alschuler collects a sample of citations to the literature debating, and mostly criticizing,
the “right to remain silent” interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at
2647–60. For discussion of “England’s lead” in abandoning Griffin and Miranda, and its application to the present problem, see infra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
17. See Lissa Griffin, Is Silence Sacred? The Vulnerability of Griffin v.
California in a Terrorist World, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 927, 929 (2007)
(“[T]his disfavored status is particularly dangerous in light of the modern
threat of domestic terrorism.”).
18. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 2628 n.11 (noting this point while ultimately rejecting Griffin and this rationale); Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the
Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 503 (2005); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U.
L. REV. 311, 334 –35 (1991); see also Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189,
196 (1943) (“The claim of privilege and its allowance is properly no part of the
evidence submitted to the jury, and no inferences whatever can be legitimately
drawn by them from the legal assertion by the witness of his constitutional
right.” (quoting Phelin v. Kenderdine, 20 Pa. 354, 363 (1853))).
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“there is no neutral, determinate way to classify what counts as
a ‘penalty.’”19 Yet its entire project is explicitly centered around
“punishing” the defendant for remaining silent. The article
seems to want it both ways; it attempts to refute the theoretical
implications of the result it seeks to accomplish in fact. If, as
the article both assumes and advocates, abolition of Griffin
does “punish” the defendant in fact for exercising the right to
remain silent, then it is difficult to follow the logic by which the
doctrinal consequences of that result may be denied.20
In any event, the underlying problem is that an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that includes a robust right to remain silent presents a constitutional conundrum. Its central
role in today’s criminal justice system is to provide some actual
protection for a defendant’s choice not to serve as a testimonial
resource in prosecution against him; but making defendants
serve as testimonial resources (including through adverse inference) is what prevailing Anglo-American criminal practice in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was largely about.21
The difficulty is that the criminal justice systems in both America and England have changed dramatically in this fundamental respect, from effectively requiring defendants to speak to
preventing them from being required to do so.22 The strict ori19. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1343.
20. Making Defendants Speak’s emphasis on refuting the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is something of a strawman. That doctrine, according to
the source cited by Making Defendants Speak, “serves to mediate the boundary between constitutional rights and government prerogatives in the areas
of spending, licensing, and employment.” Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 593 (1990). The Court
has explicitly applied unconstitutional conditions doctrine, for example, in the
area of land-use regulation. E.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385
(1994). The nontestifying defendant, unlike the landowner in Dolan, is not being asked to give up one right in exchange for a discretionary concession, such
as relief from otherwise applicable regulations, conferred by the government.
Instead, the government is seeking to use the fact of the defendant’s assertion
of the right for the very purpose the right itself otherwise would prohibit: as
evidence of guilt. The problem here is not identifying whether the regulatory
state has or has not actually intruded on an individual in a constitutionally
sensitive area. Such an inquiry does not seem coherent in the context of a
criminal prosecution. The problem is defining the limitations on the ways in
which the government may deploy its prosecutorial resources as it does intrude powerfully and unmistakably on a particular individual.
21. See infra Part I.A.
22. As noted below, there has been a partial retrogression in England and
Wales (and Northern Ireland), which never constitutionalized these protections. See infra notes 144–49 and accompanying text.
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ginalist interpretation of the Fifth Amendment rejects the constitutional relevance of the law’s development since its adoption, while the modern interpretation finds scant support in the
practices and understandings prevailing in the very different
system of its adoption.
This Essay, rather than choosing between the Fifth
Amendment as palimpsest or as tabula rasa, suggests instead
that it is especially appropriate in the case of the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination to take deliberate account of this sea change in criminal procedure and
thereby to give meaningful content to that protection beyond
founding-era practice. We begin by summarizing now-familiar
scholarship concerning the origins of the modern right to remain silent at trial and explaining how we believe a robust conception of the right, which includes Griffin’s no-adverseinference rule, can be reconciled with that historical account.
Our proposed reconciliation also suggests why Making Defendant Speak’s focus on the defendant’s right to testify is misplaced. It is true that in a literal sense the right to remain silent and the right to speak at trial are antipodal in that
exercise of one displaces the other. As a practical matter, however, the important corollary of the right to remain silent is
generally not the defendant’s right to speak for himself at trial
but the right to have someone else speak for him. It was the
emergence of an active and potent role for defense counsel in
putting the prosecution to its burden of proof through a real
adversarial process to which more recent scholarship attributes
the origins of the modern right to remain silent. Today, a robust right to remain silent assumes a central role in conjunction with the right to counsel and the prosecution’s burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in an adversarial system. Griffin, so far as it goes, reinforces that constellation of protections.
A. THAT WAS THEN
If relatively recent scholarship concerning the origins of
the right to remain silent is valid, the problem with Griffin is
not Griffin, it is the Fifth Amendment. That work has challenged the traditional view that the modern right originates in
opposition to the oath ex officio and the Ecclesiastical courts or
more generally to resistance to encroachment by the European
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inquisitorial model.23 John Langbein shows that the wellestablished common law practice in ordinary criminal trials in
England—which practice the colonists brought and adapted to
British North America and which largely persisted as a practical matter both before and immediately after the adoption of
the Fifth Amendment24—was dominated by what he has characterized as the “accused speaks” approach to criminal trials.25
As Langbein put it, “[t]he logic of the early modern criminal
trial was to pressure the accused into serving as a testimonial
resource.”26 He has argued that the modern right to remain silent at trial emerged not from the constitutional struggles in
seventeenth-century England and John Lilburne’s invocation of
the principle reflected in the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere27 before the Star Chamber, but from a “profound reordering” of the criminal trial process in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries away from the “accused speaks” model
and toward the “testing the prosecution” model.28 The central
figure in this reordering, whose emerging role was both required and made possible by it, was defense counsel.
23. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 43–82 (1968);
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2250, at
269 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
24. See Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086,
1122–23 (1994).
25. John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1994). Langbein’s work complements that of other scholars who trace nemo tenetur seipsum propere not to opposition by common law courts to inquisitorial processes
but instead to the ius commune, and who have sought to unpack the jurisdictional struggles between the Star Chamber and common law courts. See generally Charles M. Gray, Self-Incrimination in Interjurisdictional Law: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 47, 47–81 (R.H. Helmholz
ed., 1997); Richard H. Helmholz, The Privilege and the Ius Commune: The
Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 17, 17–46. Levy’s
spirited rebuttal of these works, which spends a considerable number of its
pages on Langbein, does not effectively controvert his conclusion that the “accused speaks” model characterized pre-nineteenth century English criminal
practice. See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment and Its Critics,
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 821, 833–49 (1997) (responding to Langbein).
26. Langbein, supra note 25, at 1058–59.
27. Translated, the maxim means “no one is bound to inform against himself.” Helen Silving, The Oath: Part I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1366–67 (1959). See
generally John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV.
71 (1891) (discussing the origin of the maxim).
28. Langbein, supra note 25, at 1047.
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Langbein has argued that foreclosure of an effective role
for defense counsel formed the “bedrock principle” of the “accused speaks” trial, the primary justifications for which find a
modern echo in works such as Making Defendants Speak: (1)
that innocent defendants are their own best advocates, and (2)
that guilty defendants’ self-incrimination is a needed testimonial resource.29 Other aspects of the system—including pretrial confinement, limitations on defendants’ ability to compel
witnesses to testify for the defense and on even voluntary defense witnesses’ testimony, a poorly formulated and weakly
realized prosecutorial burden and standard of proof, and constraints on defendants’ pretrial preparation—all combined to
leave defendants little choice but to speak at trial:
Thus, the defendant was not only locked up, denied the assistance of
counsel in preparing and presenting his defense, and restricted in obtaining defense witnesses, he was also given no precise statement of
the charges against him until he stood before the court at the moment
of his trial. The total drift of these measures was greatly to restrict
defensive opportunity of any sort other than responding personally at
trial to the incriminating evidence.30

The pressure to speak obtained routinely in pretrial examination of defendants by magistrates under the Marian
Committal Statute of 1555,31 the purpose of which was “to collect only prosecution evidence;” the defendant was “expected to
answer” the magistrate’s questions and any refusal to do so
would be reported by the magistrate at trial.32 The pressure to
speak continued at trial, which as a practical matter usually
was more about whether the defendant would be convicted of a
capital crime or some lesser offense (or would obtain a judicial
recommendation to the crown for clemency) than it was about
ultimate guilt or innocence.33 The “accused speaks” model apparently was effective: assertion of a privilege against selfincrimination by defendants in ordinary criminal trials in England appears to have been virtually nonexistent.34
Eben Moglen’s study has found that the “accused speaks”
model described by Langbein “represented the common core of
29. See id. at 1053–54. Langbein has pointed out that, even after defense
counsel were permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses, the continuing prohibition on defense counsel addressing the jury as a practical matter
forced defendants to speak for themselves. Id. at 1055.
30. Id. at 1058.
31. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ch. 10 (Eng.).
32. Id. at 1059–61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 1064 –65.
34. Id. at 1066.
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English criminal procedure in America during the first century
of settlement.”35 If anything, for a number of reasons (including
scarcity of lawyers and ideological antipathy towards them) defense counsel’s role in early American criminal trials was even
more circumscribed.36 Also, as a practical matter, “sworn or unsworn, defense witnesses at trial generally were scarce commodities.”37 And pretrial examination before magistrates, following the Marian Committal Statute process, drove toward
self-incrimination.38 “Colonial American criminal justice depended upon self-incrimination in practice precisely because
the basic design of the system assumed it would.”39 The doctrine of nemo tenetur prodere seipsum did have some traction in
attitudes about examination of witnesses and the accused by
the authorities and on the use of violence (including threat of
spiritual violence through the oath ex officio)—although physical violence apparently was not completely prohibited but instead calibrated by the doctrine.40 And the abhorrence of oaths
was circumvented by the simple expedient of examining the accused unsworn.41 Nevertheless, Moglen concluded, as a practical matter:
[A]t the center of that system stood the defendant, friendless and
alone, confronting the evidence and his fate. So long as he remained
in that condition, and it was the fixed purpose of the system to keep
him there, any notion of the defendant’s privilege against selfincrimination was but a phantom of the law.42

This state of affairs, he found, reflected social conditions at
the time—a geographically dispersed population, scant prosecutorial and judicial resources, social and economic stratification disadvantaging the itinerant and the indigent, a minimal
or nonexistent defense bar, and increasing social disorder in
the decades immediately preceding the Revolution—which
combined to increase reliance on summary jurisdiction of lay
magistrates and further promote the “accused speaks” model.43
This recital raises the question of how to reconcile the facially broad state and federal constitutional provisions related
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Moglen, supra note 24, at 1091–92.
See id. at 1092–93.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1104.
Id.
See id. at 1100–01.
Id. at 1104.
See id. at 1105–11.

20

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES

[94:11

to criminal procedure (including nemo tenetur) embraced by
Revolutionary Americans with the apparently conflicting practices then prevailing.44 Moglen’s account is two-fold. First,
those provisions were seen as protecting not against current
criminal practices but against rhetorically powerful but even
then-dated images such as the Star Chamber and the potential
future adoption of “innovative” or “foreign” practices; they were
measures conservatory rather than reformatory of extant legal
structures.45 Second, he argued that those constitutional provisions converged on the lay jury as the ultimate protection
against government overreaching: “these procedural guarantees, including the privilege against self-incrimination, were
part of a cluster of legal rules, conceived not primarily as independent, free-standing rights, but rather as part of the constitutional system for protecting all rights by ensuring that government activity met the fundamental check of juries subject to
law.”46
B. THIS IS NOW
The foregoing account has been recited, along with criticism of the conceptual and moral underpinnings of the right to
silence, in support of a more historically faithful interpretation
of the Fifth Amendment that would allow a return to those earlier practices, including adverse inferences from the accused’s
silence in pretrial examinations and at trial.47 We think, however, that it can also point the other way. It provides a benchmark against which to gauge just how profoundly our criminal
justice system—and our understanding of the Fifth Amend44. Alschuler parts company with Moglen at this juncture, contending
that the Framers would not have seen an inconsistency between prevailing
practices and constitutional protections, largely because criminal defendants
were not placed under oath and therefore not subject to that peculiar form of
compulsion. Alschuler, supra note 16, at 2657–58. For an argument that the
right to counsel and the formal adversary system were well-established by the
time of the Revolution, see Randolph Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 95–96 (1995); Randolph Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: America Before
England, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 323, 327–28 (2008). For the argument that the
privilege was well-established both in post-revolutionary England and prerevolutionary British North America, see R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and
Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America,
21 VA. L. REV. 763, 775 (1935).
45. Moglen, supra note 24, at 1116–22.
46. Id. at 1118.
47. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 16, at 2669–72.
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ment—has changed, and that transformation itself suggests
that the intuitions underlying the right to silence may be larger
than the sum of its many critics.
While neither yesterday’s nor today’s systems completely
fit Langbein’s respective labels, it is clear that we have moved
quite far from an “accused speaks” toward a “test the prosecution” model largely in the ways Langbein and Moglen identify.
If the extent to which historical practice reflected the “accused
speaks” model is taken as a measure of founding-era acceptance of its normative precepts, then it would seem that the
pervasiveness of today’s “test the prosecution” approach indicates the contemporary dominance of the latter approach’s
premises. And if the central figure in that transformation is defense counsel, then that figure’s ubiquity and recognition as
foundational to the modern adversary system marks the extent
of the transformation. Although the Court has vacillated, sometimes importantly so, on the particulars of the right to counsel,48 that right nevertheless receives both rhetorical recognition and substantial protection, and the unrepresented criminal
defendant in all but the most minor of cases is a rare exception.
The right to counsel is a fundamental fair-trial right,49 the
denial of which is per se harmful error,50 for without a lawyer
to assist him, the confrontation between defendant and accusers can hardly be called fair. “[L]awyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries.”51 The right appertains whenever the
48. In Montejo v. Louisiana, Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Souter and Breyer) dissented from the Court’s overruling of Michigan v. Jackson. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2094 (2009) (citing Jackson, 475 U.S. 623
(1986)) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority found Jackson unnecessary, given that its purpose was to prevent police from badgering defendants in the
custodial interrogation setting. Id. at 2089 (majority opinion). Thus, Jackson
overlapped with the protections already provided by the Miranda-EdwardsMinnick line of cases. Id. at 2089–90. The dissenters disagreed, noting that
the right to counsel attaches when adversarial judicial proceedings begin and
guarantees the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a prosecution
whether in or out of court. Id. at 2094 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Sixth
Amendment right protects the accused (usually an unaided layman) at critical
stages of adversarial confrontation. Its protections are not limited to the Miranda custodial interrogation setting; it is much broader. See id. at 2100. It
protects “the public’s interest in knowing that counsel, once secured, may be
reasonably relied upon as a medium between the accused and the power of the
State. That interest lies at the heart of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.” Id.
at 2098.
49. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
50. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 290 (1991) (citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)).
51. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
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defendant is subjected to actual imprisonment,52 whether
charged with a petty offense, a misdemeanor, or a felony,53 and
it applies not only at trial but during the pretrial stage “when
consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation [are]
vitally important.”54 In fact, the pretrial stage may present
even greater dangers for the defendant than the trial itself.55
The fundamental, essential role of counsel is recognized by
related Sixth Amendment cases as well as in other contexts.
The Court’s recent Confrontation Clause cases recognize that a
fair trial is not one that reaches an accurate result in a truthseeking process but, rather, one that reaches a fair result in an
adversarial system.56 The Sixth Amendment “commands, not
that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination.”57 The Court also relied on the role of counsel in
abandoning a seventy-year-old evidentiary tradition of deferring to scientific or other specialized sources for a determination of when an expert witness might offer opinion testimony,
replacing it with a more traditional evidentiary approach that
relies on “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof
[as] the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence.”58 And where expert testimony is criti52. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979).
53. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
54. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (quoting Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). This principle has been “broadly reaffirmed”
by the Supreme Court. Id. at 205 (citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963)); see also Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977) (“[T]he clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary
proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him.”); Gideon, 372 U.S. at
342–45.
55. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2099 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“Given the realities of modern criminal prosecution, the critical
proceedings at which counsel’s assistance is required more and more often occur outside the courtroom in pretrial proceedings . . . .”).
56. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009)
(reaffirming the prosecution’s obligation to prove the defendant’s guilt in an
adversarial process, a process which “may make the prosecution of criminals
more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the
privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those
other constitutional provisions—is binding, and we may not disregard it at our
convenience.”); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
57. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
58. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596
(1993).
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cal, the defendant has a due process right not only to crossexamine the state’s expert, but also to an expert’s assistance “in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense”59 in
an adversarial system where counsel, not the defendant, tests
the government’s evidence.
The right to counsel is explicitly and implicitly linked to
the protections against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment. In both the state and federal confession cases that
led up to Miranda,60 there was an element of deprivation of
counsel that troubled the Court.61 When the Court applied the
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause to the states, it
noted that ours is an accusatorial, not inquisitorial, system, in
which a person has the right “to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to
suffer no penalty, as held in Twining, for such silence.”62 Escobedo v. Illinois,63 the Court’s last gasp at avoiding Miranda,
tried to “tease back” the Sixth Amendment to reach the problem of incommunicado questioning. With Miranda, however,
the Court finally recognized what it had been wrestling with in
various, disparate contexts64: that the right to silence was
meaningless unless the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation were to be diffused by warning the suspect not only of
his right to silence, but of his right to an attorney to help make
the right to silence meaningful.65 In the four decades since Mi59. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
60. Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
61. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513–15 (1963) (repeated requests to call counsel denied); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–
23 (1959) (defendant’s requests for counsel ignored); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357
U.S. 504, 511 (1958) (mutual requests by lawyer and client to meet were denied), abrogated by Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 n.48; Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433, 439–40 (1958) (law student request for counsel at beginning of interrogation denied), abrogated by Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 n.48. The cases of
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455–56 (1957), and McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 –45 (1943), modified by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(2006), as recognized in Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1571 (2009),
taken together, respond to a concern that defendants not be left to their own
devices when dealing with the criminal justice system.
62. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
63. 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (2006).
64. The counsel issue also arose in the Fourth Amendment setting, for one
of the critical concerns in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961) (applying the
exclusionary rule to the states), was the fact that the police would not allow
the suspect to consult with her attorney, who was present at Dollree Mapp’s
home when it was unlawfully searched.
65. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.
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randa, the Court’s jurisprudence has been inconsistent to say
the least;66 but if the Court seriously wanted to rethink the involvement of, and reliance on, defense counsel in the criminal
justice system, that opportunity came with Dickerson v. United
States.67 Rather than upholding Congress’s attempt to overrule
Miranda two years after the case was decided,68 the Court instead found Miranda to be part of our national culture and a
constitutional decision that Congress is without power to reject.69
Both the right to counsel and the privilege against selfincrimination reinforce the accusatory and adversarial nature
of the criminal justice system. Thus, as David Sklansky recently put it, “[a]nti-inquisitorialism” is “a broad and enduring
theme of American criminal procedure.”70 At the conclusion of
its 2008 term,71 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its view that
ours is an accusatorial, confrontational system of criminal justice in which the government has the burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt when it chooses to exercise the power to punish. “[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on
the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant
to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”72 The Court’s re66. Despite the holding that no statement made in response to nonMirandized interrogation can be used against the defendant, Miranda, 384
U.S. at 479, the Court since Miranda has retreated from this central holding.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (allowing non-Mirandized
statements to be “cured” by subsequent warnings and waiver); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450–52 (1974) (allowing derivative use of nonMirandized statements); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971) (allowing collateral use of non-Mirandized statements). But see Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613 (2004) (plurality opinion) (concluding that deliberate
“question-first” tactic compromised subsequent warning’s effectiveness); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 370–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that whether a
statement is actually coerced or irrebuttably presumed to be coerced is a distinction with no constitutional significance).
67. 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1968) (“In any criminal prosecution brought
by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in
subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”).
69. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
70. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634,
1635 (2009). For analysis of the right to silence as reinforcing the prosecution’s
due process burden, see generally Marvin Schiller, On the Jurisprudence of the
Fifth Amendment Right to Silence, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 197 (1979).
71. At the time this article was written, the Supreme Court had just decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
72. Id. at 2540.
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jection of the complaint that this “may make the prosecution of
criminals more burdensome”73—a complaint frequently found
in critiques of Miranda and Griffin—is but the latest pronouncement in a line of cases of which In re Winship74 is the
foremost articulation of the principle. All these cases, taken together or alone, stand for the principle that when the government seeks to punish, it must prove each and every element of
the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, in an adversarial system in which the defendant is represented by counsel
who will test the government’s case.
In summary, whatever the normative underpinnings of the
right to silence, the modern network of rights comprising today’s “test the prosecution” criminal justice system recognizes—indeed necessitates—its presence just as potently as the
network of practices comprising the “accused speaks” system
effectuated its practical absence. And if the cluster of protections of which it is a part takes the Fifth Amendment beyond
the scope contemplated by its Framers, it does so in the context
of a criminal justice system, and more generally an administrative and bureaucratic state, which itself vastly exceeds anything familiar to them or their English counterparts.75 It is difficult to grasp the extent of those changes. The industrial,
73. Id.
74. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 230 (2005) (invalidating mandatory nature of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines; reaffirming constitutional protection of defendants against conviction in
the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; requiring that facts increasing
sentences for crimes beyond prescribed statutory maxima must be submitted
to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (requiring that “any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609
(2002) (“If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment
contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels
it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (finding that the defendant’s “sentence violated his right to ‘a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of
the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt’”); Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977) (limiting states’ ability to “reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the
crimes now defined in their statutes”); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703
(1975) (“[T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . .”).
75. Cf. Aaron M. Clemens, The Pending Reinvigoration of Boyd: Personal
Papers Are Protected by the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 25 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 75, 101 (2004) (recognizing that “the Court has been forced to interpret
the privilege in situations that the Founders did not predict”).
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administrative, and cyber revolutions have expanded government’s ability to criminalize, investigate, monitor, prosecute,
convict, and incarcerate citizens to an extent that surely would
have staggered and probably horrified founding-era imaginations.76
The extensive and complex web of today’s federal, state,
and local criminal laws, and malum prohibitum regulatory provisions enforced by criminal sanctions, would have been unimaginable in the eighteenth century.77 Indeed, several scholars have located the origins of the modern Fifth Amendment
right to silence in the late-nineteenth century’s expanding federal regulatory presence.78 Prosecutorial, defense, and judicial
resources—which were relatively scarce in colonial and revolutionary America79—are now relatively abundant and deeply institutionalized. And the entire process has managed to achieve
an incarceration rate that is one of the highest in the world.
“The most important conclusion” to be drawn about colonial-era crime throughout British North America, especially
crimes against person and property, “is that there was very little of it.”80 Social and economic conditions—small, isolated populations living primarily in villages and towns, with little va76. The founders would never have imagined the use of DNA evidence;
evidence obtained from a computer forensic examination; the use of heat sensing, x-ray, and metal detection devices; wiretap and other voice and/or video
recordings; the use of surveillance cameras; or “the results of the commonly
used gas chromatography/mass spectrometry analysis.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.
Ct. at 2537 (referring to authorities discussing critical errors in gas chromatography/mass spectrometry analysis).
77. If anything, the Court’s oddly haphazard attempts to check Congress’s
Commerce Clause power in this regard only underscore the point. Compare
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (invalidating the Violence
Against Women Act on the grounds that sex-based assaults do not constitute
“economic activity”), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act because the possession of firearms
near schools lacked a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce), with Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005) (upholding the Controlled Substances Act
by characterizing “the production, distribution, and consumption” of drugs as
having “an established, and lucrative, interstate market”).
78. See, e.g., Katharine B. Hazlett, The Nineteenth Century Origins of the
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
235, 258–59 (1998) (“As federal law grew in scope and importance, courts
turned more readily to the constitution to answer challenges to the validity of
federal statutes . . . forcing courts to determine whether the witness privilege
was a common law or constitutional right . . . .”).
79. Moglen, supra note 24, at 1105; see also supra text accompanying note
36.
80. BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: 1606–
1660, at 139 (1983).
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gabondage, low unemployment, adequate subsistence, and relatively little economic stratification—all likely contributed to the
low rate of such crime.81 And the objects of the criminal justice
system changed along with social conditions. In Massachusetts,
for example, “crimes against morality dominated in the colonial
era,”82 but by the post-revolutionary period, as wealth and populations increased and became more concentrated and stratified, property crimes and social-order related offenses came to
dominate.83 The localized and parochial nature of community
life, preoccupation with sin and heterodoxy, and the absence of
organized law enforcement authority meant that in the New
England colonies, social control derived from “intense surveillance by neighbors,” rather than “patrol by a public police,”84
thus enforcing consensus and conformist norms.85
Whereas it seems unlikely that most founding-era citizens
had personal encounters with law enforcement officials, today
such encounters are commonplace. The police presence we take
for granted (or at least in stride) today did not begin to emerge
in the United States or England until the nineteenth century.
As Carol Steiker has observed:
The metamorphosis of the colonial constabulary and watch into the
recognizable precursors of modern-day law enforcement illustrates
the ways in which the invention of the police created new threats to
liberty. Our colonial forebears could not have predicted the sheer
numbers of law enforcement agents at work today, the breadth of
their operational mandate, or their pervasive authoritarian presence.86

In comparison to the eighteenth century, the police today are
virtually everywhere, impacting the lives of almost everyone by
their very presence, and often their direct actions.87
81. Id. at 139–41.
82. MICHAEL STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767–1878,
at 63 (1980).
83. See id. at 67–70.
84. SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18 (2d ed. 1998).
85. Id. at 15–16. Walker, too, warns against overgeneralization, contrasting relatively homogenous Puritan New England (particularly Massachusetts)
with more diverse, densely populated, and cosmopolitan New York, and with
the slavery-based societies of the South (particularly South Carolina). Id. at
16–17.
86. Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 820, 837 (1994).
87. According to the United States Department of Justice, there were
836,787 full-time sworn law enforcement officers in the United States in the
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Not only has police presence become substantially more
pervasive in general, but the potential consequences of speaking to police have also become more complicated in two particular ways. First, “[a] crude conception of guilt or innocence, according to which the suspect either ‘did it’ or ‘didn’t do it’ has
tended to underpin the debate about the right to silence.”88
Some offenses, however, are defined in terms of mental states
“which separate them by a hairsbreadth from innocent conduct”
and so the police interview not only can uncover crimes, but in
a sense can also help to “create them.”89 Second, the “current
prosecutorial arsenal” concerning perjury and related offenses
exceeds its common law antecedents.90 Under the most widely
used federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, even a minimal denial of
guilt—the so-called exculpatory no—can be the basis for prosecution.91 As Justice Ginsburg has noted, this result gives prosecutors tremendous power to “manufacture crimes” (especially
given the frequency of informal, uncounseled, and unwarned
interviews of individuals by government agents).92
It is by now a familiar if not entirely uncontroversial
process for the content of a constitutional protection to evolve
beyond the particular scope its framers would have endorsed,
especially when conditions have changed in pertinent and imyear 2004, of which 731,903 were employed by almost 18,000 different state
and local agencies. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Law Enforcement Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm (last visited Nov.
17, 2009). Not only are there literally myriads of different departments, but
there are also millions-upon-millions of encounters between police and residents of the United States. In 2005, more than forty-three million, or 19% of
United States residents aged sixteen and older, had at least one face-to-face
contact with police. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 1 (2007). Many individuals
had more than one encounter and there were a total of approximately seventyone million such encounters in 2005. Id. at 2.
88. Steven Greer, The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current Debate, 53
MOD. L. REV. 709, 727 (1990).
89. Id. at 727–28.
90. Richard H. Underwood, False Witness: A Lawyer’s History of the Law
of Perjury, 10 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 215, 248 (1993).
91. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 398 (1998) (rejecting
the “exculpatory no” exception to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001,
both as a matter of statutory construction and under the Fifth Amendment).
For a comprehensive discussion of the broad scope and frequent application of
false statement laws, see generally Andrea C. Halverson & Eric D. Olson,
False Statements and False Claims, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 555 (2009).
92. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408–11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). To reduce that
risk, the Department of Justice discourages such prosecutions. See Halverson
& Olson, supra note 91, at 567 & n.93.
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portant ways.93 Application of that process to the present problem would seem especially appropriate. To the extent that critics of a robust right to silence base their position on an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment limited to founding-era
understandings, they are insisting on a return to the kind of
“accused speaks” model which obtained in a world that no longer exists and which the gradual adoption of the “test the prosecution” approach has displaced. And that displacement has resulted from invigoration of a “cluster of legal rules” oriented not
so much around the lay jury in this age of plea bargaining94 as
around the requirement that the government prove its case.
Superimposition of the earlier, much narrower interpretation
on a vastly expanded and intrusive criminal justice system,
without regard for such pervasive legal and social change,
seems anachronistic and misplaced.
II. A ROBUST RIGHT TO SILENCE
In view of these two important developments—the emergence of the “test the prosecution” model and government’s
vastly increased capacity and willingness to mobilize lawenforcement resources against its citizens—the intuitions expressed in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,95 while perhaps
hyperbolic, do not sound so out-of-place. Those “fundamental
values” and “noble aspirations” include: protection of the accused from the “cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or
contempt;” “our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system;” fear of inhumane and abusive interrogation; a “fair play” norm requiring the government to leave the
93. Famous examples include, of course, Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954) (“In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted . . . . We must consider
public education in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation.”), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9–
10 (1967) (“While these statements have some relevance to the intention of
Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be understood
that they pertained to the passage of specific statutes and not to the broader,
organic purpose of a constitutional amendment.”). The Court explicitly recognized this approach to the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”).
94. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. Despite its relatively infrequent invocation however, the right to a jury trial as a bedrock protection has
received increased emphasis in recent years by the Court. See supra note 74.
95. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
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individual alone unless there is good cause to disturb him or
her and “requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load;” respect for “inviolability of
the human personality” and a right to privacy; and protection
of innocent defendants.96 Yet the right to silence has been a
heavily criticized doctrine.
The usual approach is to consider the right in isolation and
in the abstract, and to dissect each particular rationale. As David Dolinko put it in his comprehensive critique, “[a]ppeal to an
unanalyzable intuition . . . is simply unacceptable as support
for the privilege against self-incrimination.”97 He has organized
the putative justifications into “systemic” and “individual” rationales.98 Among the justifications that he seeks to repudiate
is the systemic goal of “imposing on the government the entire
burden of proving guilt in a criminal case.”99 And among the
“individual rationales” that he finds unpersuasive are the privacy, dignity, and autonomy arguments.100 A common thread
running through criticisms of these justifications is that a right
to silence provides incomplete protection to any of the interests
they reflect. For example, the privilege does not force the government to “shoulder the entire load”101 because government
may still introduce physical evidence such as blood samples,
fingerprints, handwriting and voice exemplars, and the results
of eyewitness identification procedures, all involuntarily obtained from the accused.102 Whatever choices it protects against
are not obviously more or less “cruel” than many others it does
not preclude.103 The privilege neither protects a recognizably
distinct privacy interest nor precludes a wide array of intrusions and, in any event, constitutional privacy protections are
ordinarily subjected to a balancing test which considers the
96. Id.
97. David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1092 (1986).
98. Id. at 1065.
99. Id. at 1083. For an exposition of this justification based on the Court’s
case law, see Schiller, supra note 70, at passim.
100. Dolinko, supra note 97, at 1090–1147.
101. Id. at 1084 (citation omitted).
102. See id. at 1083. For another statement of this point, see Akhil Reed
Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 892–94 (1995). See also Steven
Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 309, 373–79 (1998) (cataloging criticisms of “self-determination” justifications for Miranda).
103. Dolinko, supra note 97, at 1090–97.
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government’s need.104 In other words, the right to silence, disliked in practice for its perceived result of shielding the guilty
and depriving the prosecution of needed evidence, is criticized
in theory for the protection it fails to effectively provide.
But perhaps more might be said in this context on behalf of
“intuition” (which, if not unanalyzed, at least is not overanalyzed), and less in favor of objections based on underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness. Underinclusiveness objections
seem more appropriately deployed in challenges to choices
made by the authorities in the assertions of governmental power, rather than to norms underlying rights claims. A government choice only minimally to pursue a particular end is some
evidence that the particular end in question is not very important105 or sincerely sought.106 This reasoning is most familiar in
cases applying antidiscrimination principles and seeks, as Justice O’Connor famously put it, to “smoke out” impermissible
purposes.107 The intensity of the scrutiny of fit is a function of
the degree of perceived risk to the norms that might constrain
the government action in question. But the privilege’s critics
surely do not mean that the Court’s rejection of Armando
Schmerber’s Fifth Amendment claim108 calls into question the
sincerity of Edward Dean Griffin’s claim. Rather, the critics
seem to mean that because the Court has permitted the intrusions it has, no meaningful portion of the rights-domain remains to be protected or that the rights-domain itself is misconceived.
104. See id. at 1108–22.
105. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715 (1984)
(“The modest nature of Oklahoma’s interests may be further illustrated by
noting that Oklahoma has chosen not to press its campaign against alcoholic
beverage advertising on all fronts.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390
(1978) (noting that the “challenged provisions” of a Wisconsin statute purporting to protect the financial interests of children were “grossly underinclusive”
with respect to the stated purpose).
106. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a
goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (same).
107. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493.
108. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (holding that
evidence of analysis of blood taken by a doctor after a drunk driving arrest
was admissible and did not violate the Fifth Amendment, despite Schmerber’s
refusal to consent to the withdrawal of blood); see also Amar & Lettow, supra
note 102, at 885 (arguing that Schmerber is an example of the privilege’s underinclusiveness).
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We see several problems with that proposition. First, even
assuming that the Court has allowed a large portion of the interest to be compromised, such result does not necessarily disprove the existence of the interest itself. The Court’s reasoning
in denying claims could be flawed.109 Second, the Court’s choices do not necessarily mean that no meaningful residuum of protected domain remains. The norms captured by capacious labels such as “privacy,” “autonomy,” or “dignity”110 are complex
and variegated such that the Court’s rejection of a part would
hardly seem to constitute negation of the whole. As we briefly
suggest below, there is recognizable and meaningful content,
even if not theoretically tidy, to a right not to testify at trial
and to preclude prosecutorial comment and judicial instruction
on its exercise.111 These difficulties with underinclusiveness
reasoning are illustrated by its application to the Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which is hardly a model of
doctrinal clarity. For example, the Court’s reasoning in New
Jersey v. T.L.O., which found that a full-blown warrantless seizure and search based only on reasonable suspicion adequately
protected the right to privacy in the school context,112 is itself
open to question on its own terms and in any event does not
exhaust the entire domain of “privacy” or “reasonableness.”113
The overinclusiveness objection—that the privilege fails to
yield through a balancing test to government need—includes at
least two flaws. An obvious one is that the text of the Fifth
Amendment, in contrast to that of the Fourth, does not include
a reasonableness element.114 Another is that the objection misapprehends the nature of privileges. They are indeed subject to
a kind of categorical balancing because their application is circumscribed, as the underinclusiveness critique is at pains to
109. See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text. Also, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). For
recent work criticizing the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence as resting
on confused premises, see Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487 passim (2009).
110. See supra text accompanying note 100.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 162–70.
112. 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985).
113. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643
(2009) (concluding that a higher standard of suspicion is required to justify
more intrusive searches, such as a strip search of a school child).
114. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”) (emphasis added),
with U.S. CONST. amend. V (containing no similar reasonableness requirement).

2009]

SPEAKING OF SILENCE

33

point out.115 But case-by-case balancing is generally not appropriate with respect to privileges. For those that protect confidential relationships, such balancing would “eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.”116 For the Fifth Amendment, as
events since September 11, 2001, demonstrate, the risk that
case-by-case balancing would effectively swallow the rule is
more than speculative.117
Nor is it clear to us that the intuitions attributable to a
right to silence are necessarily so opaque or anomalous to warrant such “strict scrutiny.”118 A point of departure in the literature critical of the right to silence is the observation that it defies, as Judge Friendly put it, “notions of decent conduct
generally accepted in life outside the court room.”119 To Judge
Friendly, this point distinguishes the Fifth Amendment privilege from most others recognized by law, which are based on
valued relations (such as the husband-wife, lawyer-client, doc-

115. Examples of limitations on the Fifth Amendment’s scope, some of
which include explicit balancing, are easy to find. See, e.g., United States v.
Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643–44 (2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542
U.S. 177, 189–91 (2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 764 –68 (2003);
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307–08 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 –58 (1984); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235–38 (1980); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 –46 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
225–26 (1971).
116. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996). Our reference here to other
privileges does not concede the “privileges” analysis in Part II.A.3 of Making
Defendants Speak. See Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1350–53 (distinguishing adverse inferences in the context of various privileges). That analysis fails
to adequately account for the constitutional interests at stake and mistakenly
assumes a background duty to speak, which the Fifth Amendment itself obviates. Cf. id. (noting the historical rationale supporting the use of adverse inferences in instances of failure to speak or to produce evidence). As Justice
Black put it, “[t]he value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” Grunewald v. United States, 353
U.S. 391, 425 (1957) (Black, J., concurring). For an argument that adverse inferences from invocation of the attorney-client privilege compromise that relationship, see Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences upon a
Claim of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1355, 1407–20
(1995).
117. For a description of such a process regarding the Fourth Amendment,
see Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings
of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 745–47 (2007).
118. Dolinko concluded that they were. Dolinko, supra note 97, at 1068–69
(considering, as a threshold matter, whether the privilege “really needs justifying” and concluding that it does based on “our ordinary intuitions as to when
silence in the face of accusatory questioning is appropriate”).
119. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 680 (1968).
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tor-patient, and priest-penitent privileges).120 Kent Greenawalt
has attempted to bridge that perceived disparity by observing
that in their ordinary relations, people do not expect to be obligated to account for their conduct to one another, unless the relations are especially close, or the basis for inquiry or suspicion
is especially strong.121 Dolinko quotes Friendly as an example
of the “consensus” view that the right to silence is morally perverse, and sees in the Greenawalt principle a lever for prying
the privilege away from criminal defendants who, after all, are
not in close relation to the state, and against whom there is almost always more than a slender basis for suspicion.122 This
latter point provided the moral ground for Alschuler’s proposal
to overrule Griffin and return to something like the Marian
Committal Statute process.123
But what would things look like if we turned the telescope
around and, as we should at the rights-recognition stage,
viewed the matter from the defendant’s perspective? As indicated above, the robust right to silence in general, and Griffin
in particular, are not some dusty vestige of an outmoded legal
past, but are part of a cluster of developments to emerge in today’s criminal justice system. One would expect that the intuitions it reflects are compatible with, rather than antithetical to,
modern sensibilities. And so they are, if one keeps in mind the
nature of the relations involved and views them from the defendant’s perspective.
Friendly’s objection to the privilege124 and Greenawalt’s
sophisticated attempt to justify a limited scope for it125 would
impose the moral understandings and expectations of interpersonal relations on the uniquely inhuman relation between the
accused and the state. The mistake in that move underscores
our point. The relational norms of reciprocal care and regard
between actual people simply do not obtain with the state, es120. Id. (contrasting “most other privileges” with the Fifth Amendment).
121. See R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right,
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 20–32 (1981) (analyzing the role of silence in certain private relationships).
122. Dolinko, supra note 97, at 1068–69 (comparing the viewpoints of
Friendly and Greenawalt).
123. See Alschuler, supra note 16, at 2633–38, 2668–69 (examining Greenawalt’s theories and proposing alternatives to the current self-incrimination
privilege).
124. See Friendly, supra note 119, at 721–26 (proposing his own alterations
to the Fifth Amendment).
125. For an analysis of his position on the privilege, see Greenawalt, supra
note 121, at 17–71.
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pecially when it seeks to punish.126 The state is not a person
who has feelings we ought to consider at all, or who will consider any actual person’s feelings in return, and it is an error to
premise any argument on such an analogy.127 The state itself—
even if represented by actual people who may be decent and
humane individuals—is an inhuman, faceless, unfeeling, often
voracious and potentially malignant entity which is precisely
why relations with it are always a matter of rights and power
rather than care and respect. The very notion of constitutional
government presupposes this point. It is naive at best and dangerous at worst to draw, as does Friendly, an analogy between
a prosecutor and the loving and forgiving parent who is expected to have his or her child’s best interests at heart.128 In
any event, even Judge Friendly’s intuitions got the better of his
analysis in the end. After soundly ridiculing the Murphy claims
on behalf of the privilege, he noted that many defendants are
“uneducated, unfortunate persons, frightened by their predicament” and opted to retain much of the current privilege’s protections, including its prohibition on adverse comment.129
Murphy’s much-maligned intuitions, even if overstated,
may come closer to capturing the peculiar circumstances of
criminal prosecution. The right to silence, if nothing else, preserves one small refuge of dignity for the accused and imposes
one relatively modest constraint on governmental power.130 We
126. For a discussion of rights and care in the context of abortion rights,
compare, for example, Donald P. Judges, Taking Care Seriously: Relational
Feminism, Sexual Difference, and Abortion, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1323 passim
(1995).
127. Dolinko acknowledges this point. Dolinko, supra note 97, at 1070 n.43
(“The notion that one could have a personal relationship with the government
may even be dangerous . . . .”); see also Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 321
(“Whether Greenawalt (and Friendly) can fairly build on the morality of private relationships to draw inferences about our moral obligations vís-a-vís the
state seems to me highly debatable.”).
128. See Friendly, supra note 119, at 680 (“[T]he lesson parents preach is
that while a misdeed . . . will generally be forgiven, a failure to make a clean
breast of it will not be.”).
129. Id. at 699–700 (quoting Alfred C. Clapp, Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 541, 548 (1956)). Thus, Friendly responds
to a concern that defendants not be left to their own devices when dealing with
the criminal justice system. See id. (noting that such a practice “would be
cruel”). Greenawalt, disputing the “penalty” rationale of Griffin, would allow
“restrained judicial comment inviting natural adverse inferences . . . at least
in jurisdictions that do not allow free use of prior convictions to impeach credibility.” See Greenawalt, supra note 121, at 58–59.
130. For a theoretical account of the norm in privacy terms, see Robert S.
Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 passim (1970).
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believe this protection is more than inconsequential, even if
modest in practical effect and conceptually indefinite. In a
criminal prosecution the state seeks to deploy whatever resources it deems worthwhile for the infliction of punishment on
the accused. The ultimate goal may be justice, however well—
or ill—conceived and realized, but as a practical matter the
immediate aim is conviction and punishment; and whatever
protections the accused can expect throughout the entire dehumanizing process derive not from care but from rights. It
does not seem to us to flout ordinary moral understandings to
recognize a right in someone to refuse to cooperate by providing
a public account of his actions to a vastly more powerful and
inhuman adversary, itself speaking exclusively through counsel, which is specifically bent on hurting him. To the contrary,
it seems of a piece with an understanding of the entire process
which, while allowing the state latitude in evidence collection
(including the collection of physical evidence from the accused)
and presentation, allows the accused to otherwise stand mute
and put the state to its proof.
One of the difficulties in the literature on this subject is its
theoretical nature, which reflects a triumph of abstraction over
empathy. We do not believe that most ordinary people, actually
confronted with the shock of finding themselves in the position
of a criminal defendant, would have trouble understanding the
refuge the right to silence provides. One of us served for years
as a federal public defender and found that, apart from those
who thought they could outsmart the system or the thoroughly
angry and defiant, most clients were simply terrified—terrified
at being caught up in the system, by the government’s enormous power, of interrogation and cross-examination, and most of
all, terrified by the utter dehumanizing impersonality of it all.
They were no longer Ed or Mary, but “the suspect,” “the accused,” “the defendant,” or “the prisoner.” They faced the impersonalized overwhelming power of the jail, the courtroom,
and the judge. The right to silence at the least protects the individual from having to subject himself or herself directly and
personally to a face-to-face attack by the determined agents of
the state.131 And Griffin’s rule recognizes that it is unseemly to
131. See Schulhofer, supra note 18, at 332 (noting that these concerns are
especially potent for the innocent defendant “who fears he will be manipulated, intimidated or misunderstood”). As Schulhofer pointed out, “[w]hen life
or liberty is at stake, to force such a defendant to run the gauntlet of adversarial cross-examination can fairly be described as inhumane or cruel.” Id.
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empower the government to overtly bully the defendant in front
of the jury by inviting an inference of guilt where there is only
silence.
In the end, a robust right to silence, as an integral part of
the cluster of rights comprising the “test the prosecution” model, has held its own in American constitutional jurisprudence
despite its many energetic and thoughtful critics. This persistence may reflect a set of intuitions which, while not analytically tidy or entirely satisfying, are well-suited to the harsh realities of the modern criminal justice system. Griffin’s no-adverseinference rule, by precluding the prosecution and judge from
inviting the jury to employ the silence of the accused as evidence of his guilt,132 is consistent with that right. Its principle
was well-established in the nation’s jurisprudence before Griffin, as forty-four states and the federal government had
adopted it by that time.133 It is a rule which the Court in its
last consideration characterized as “of proven utility,”134 as
having found “wide acceptance in the legal culture,” and as
having “become an essential feature of our legal tradition,”135
and which even its critics on the Court (with the lone exception
of Justice Thomas) expressly declined to reconsider.136
132. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that “the Fifth
Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s
silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt”).
133. Id. at 611 n.3 (“The overwhelming consensus of the States . . . is opposed to allowing comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.”). The trend it
reflects thus was much more firmly established than that embraced under the
Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency” test. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 –65 (2005) (holding that imposition of capital punishment on one who committed a crime while under the age of eighteen years violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 314 –16 (2002) (holding that execution of the mentally retarded violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause). And, unlike a freestanding right to post-conviction access to DNA testing, which the Court found
was not required by due process despite its adoption in all but a handful of
states, neither finality of judgments nor management of post-conviction procedures is implicated by the rule in Griffin. See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322 (2009) (“If we extended substantive due process to
this area, we would cast these [forty-six state] statutes into constitutional
doubt and be forced to take over the issue of DNA access ourselves.”).
134. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329 (1999) (extending the
Griffin rule to preclude a sentencing court from drawing an adverse inference
from the defendant’s silence).
135. Id. at 330.
136. Id. at 331–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the assertion “that
the no-adverse-inference rule has found ‘wide acceptance in the legal culture’ . . . . may be true—which is adequate reason not to overrule these cases,
a course I in no way propose” (quoting id. at 329 (majority opinion))).
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III. MAKING DEFENDANTS SPEAK AS TOO MUCH SUGAR
FOR A DIME
A. “ZERO-SUM GAME”
In addition to our defense of the right to silence, we also offer a few comments on several particular points presented in
Making Defendants Speak. First, its “zero-sum game” paradigm
seems misplaced as a practical matter.137 For one thing, its
proposed reforms are not necessarily interdependent. Making
Defendants Speak makes a good case for reform of the standards governing admissibility of prior convictions to reduce the
prejudice to the testifying defendant as a matter of evidence
law.138 They could be implemented without overruling Griffin.
Our concerns about overruling Griffin obtain whether the Rule
609(a)(1) standard is modified or not. Impeachment by prior
conviction is of course a large practical disincentive to testifying, but it is not the only concern. Further, reform of the Rule
609(a)(1) standards obviously would do defendants without a
prior criminal record no good at all. For them, even under Making Defendant Speak’s own paradigm, it’s all stick and no carrot. And Making Defendants Speak would perversely put the
innocent, anxious, vulnerable defendant—without any prior
convictions and who has nothing much to say except an unconvincing “I didn’t do it”—in the worst position of all.139 As for the
proposed reform to the sentencing guidelines, its main effect
may be to drive the consideration of perjury underground in the
nonmandatory sentencing guidelines systems under Blakely v.
Washington140 and United States v. Booker.141
Making Defendants Speak is more usefully regarded as a
relatively weak form of “exchange abolitionism.”142 This term
was coined in a rebuttal to advocates of what was to become the
137. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1328 (characterizing the matter as a
“zero-sum” game).
138. Id. at 1358–69 (proposing to abandon the Gordon test for Federal Rule
of Evidence 609).
139. See Mike Redmayne, English Warnings, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047,
1064 (2008) (explaining the problematic aspect of the evidentiary use of adverse inference in the case of innocent defendants); Schulhofer, supra note 18,
at 332–33 (noting that concerns about risks to the innocent and silent defendant apply “even if th[e] rule were substantially limited or repealed”). Our
concerns are not limited to the innocent defendant.
140. 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004).
141. 543 U.S. 220, 258–65 (2005) (Roberts, J., concurring).
142. See generally Greer, supra note 88, at 719–24.
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Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994143 (the CJPOA)
in England and Wales, which permitted adverse inferences to
be drawn from the accused’s silence during police interrogations as well as at trial.144 Adoption of the CJPOA has inspired
leading American critics of Griffin and Miranda, such as Alschuler.145 “Exchange abolitionism” would “argue for the abolition of the right to silence in exchange for other defendants’
rights.”146 That exchange ultimately occurred in reverse order
in England and Wales when the CJPOA was proposed to rectify
a perceived imbalance between prosecution and defense attributed to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984147
(PACE), which provided suspects ready access to free legal advice during police interrogations (among other important protections).148 Making Defendants Speak is abolitionism because
its premises are aimed at undermining the right to silence, but
it is relatively weak because it purports to reach only silence at
trial, and offers an only modest if not illusory exchange.
The exchange proposed in Making Defendants Speak differs from the CJPOA model in several notable respects (in addition to not extending to pretrial interrogations). First, reforms
to allow adverse inferences are advocated either on “evidential”

143. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33 (Eng.).
144. See Greer, supra note 87, at 719 (defining exchange abolitionism). According to Greer, “exchange abolitionism” is a softer version of “utilitarian abolitionism,” which in turn is based on Bentham’s complaints about “the privilege of silence” as the illegitimate refuge of the guilty and his position that the
superordinate purpose of adjudication is accuracy of outcome. See id. (noting
Bentham’s influence on utilitarian abolitionism). This latter approach would
completely abolish any right to silence and most other defense rights as well.
See id. (noting that utilitarian abolitionism theory “argued for the abolition of
the right to silence without seeking to replace it with other safeguards for defendants”).
145. See generally Alschuler, supra note 16.
146. Greer, supra note 88, at 719. As Greer observed, “[s]ome closet utilitarians may also be found in the [exchange abolitionism] camp, not because they
have been converted to the notion of defendants’ rights, but because they may
consider that acceding to rights discourse is the most effective way of achieving the abolition of the right to silence.” Id.
147. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (Eng.).
148. See generally Redmayne, supra note 139, at 1048–54 (outlining the
background to the CJPOA and summarizing PACE). The CJPOA allows adverse inferences from the accused’s silence during interrogation only if he relied at trial on a fact he did not present during earlier interrogation. Id. at
1048–49 (explaining the “triggering conditions” for adverse inferences). It generally allows the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference from the accused’s
silence at trial. See id. at 1047.
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or “incentivizing” grounds.149 “Evidential” grounds rest on an
assumed logical relationship between the accused’s silence and
the adverse inference: that silence during police questioning
and at trial is indeed probative of guilt.150 “Incentivizing”
grounds rest on an assumed empirical relationship between the
inference and the accused’s likely behavior: that adverse inference will in fact encourage the accused to talk to police or to
testify at trial.151 Making Defendants Speak frames its entire
project around incentivizing grounds and does not address the
implications and nuances of the evidential perspective. Yet, as
Redmayne explains, incentivizing grounds are proper (quite
apart from the normative debate about the right to silence itself) only if evidential relationships exist.152 Empirical support
for incentivizing arguments is problematic;153 and the evidential relationships, especially with respect to a general adverse
inference, can be complex and are not always well-founded.154
Second, the exchange in England and Wales mostly involved—indeed, was in part a reaction to—measures that
strengthened the accused’s access to counsel during police interviews.155 Making Defendants Speak offers as one of the puta149. See id. at 1051 (noting the perceived imbalance sought to be corrected
by the incentivizing argument). The pre-PACE Report of the Criminal Law
Revision Committee invoked evidential arguments in recommending adverse
inferences. See Greer, supra note 88, at 715 (describing the basis for the Report’s recommendations); Redmayne, supra note 139, at 1051 (noting the evidentiary argument for reform was the “principal one relied upon” by the
Committee). Post-PACE arguments included incentivizing justifications. See
generally Greer, supra note 88, at 716–18 (noting the political debates after
the enactment of PACE).
150. See Redmayne, supra note 139, at 1051 (noting that the evidentiary
argument is based on the assumption that “[s]ilence . . . is evidence of guilt,
and should therefore be drawn to the fact finder’s attention”).
151. See id. (arguing that “the threat of adverse inferences may encourage
defendants to testify, and this will provide fact-finders with more information
than they would otherwise get”).
152. Id.
153. See Greer, supra note 88, at 720–23.
154. See, e.g., Redmayne, supra note 139, at 1075 (noting the general adverse inference is “quite complex”). Redmayne notes that “there may be innocent explanations for silence,” including that “[a]n innocent defendant may
worry that he will perform particularly poorly on cross-examination owing to
being inarticulate or nervous.” Id. Counsel for some defendants may legitimately conclude that the client’s demeanor is itself prejudicial independently
of the content of the testimony. Cf. id. at 1075–76 (noting that nervousness
may become prejudicial if the evidence supports such an inference).
155. See Greer, supra note 88, at 720 (“Some recent studies have suggested
that there has been an increase in the number of suspects remaining silent in
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tive benefits of its proposed reform a weakening of the relationship between counsel and the accused, and the “exchange” right
it proposes is in effect the “right” of self-incrimination.156 This
strikes us as a remarkably poor exchange.
Third, the consequences of unqualified importation of the
adverse inference to the United States would be far more dire
than in England and Wales precisely because of the problem
identified by Making Defendants Speak—the virtually automatic character impeachment by prior convictions.157 “To that extent,” Redmayne has observed, “Griffin is right.”158 Where Making Defendants Speak proposes only a relatively modest
adjustment to the balancing test for admissibility of prior convictions, Redmayne would require such evidence to be disallowed altogether. He concluded that, if “testifying defendants
[may] be impeached by previous convictions in situations where
nontestifying defendants would not be, the use of silence as
evidence is deeply problematic.”159
B. ACCURACY, PARTICIPATION, AND EQUITY
We also are skeptical of Making Defendants Speak’s argument that overruling Griffin is necessary, or even very useful,
to increase the accuracy of criminal proceedings. If increased
accuracy is the goal, other means more promising and less burdensome on rights are worth exploring.
Griffin’s scope is limited. It does not constrain government’s investigative capacity. It applies only to the small proportion (usually ten percent or fewer) of defendants who actually go to trial160 and the even smaller number (perhaps fewer
police custody and that this correlates with improved access to legal representation since the enactment of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.”).
156. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1328–29 (arguing that one “beneficial
side” of pressuring defendants to testify includes a reduction in dependence on
lawyers).
157. See Redmayne, supra note 139, at 1087–88 (noting that defendants
may believe taking the stand will lead to impeachment through prior convictions).
158. Id. at 1088.
159. Id.
160. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21 (4th ed. 2008)
(“Typically, no more than 15% of the felony prosecutions reaching the general
trial court will be resolve by a trial . . . . Setting aside dismissals, and looking
only to guilty pleas and trials, the ratio of guilty pleas to trials in the general
trial court typically will exceed ten to one.”); see also GEORGE FISHER, PLEA
BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 98
(2003) (displaying a table that shows that in the year 1900 only 13% to 14% of
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than half of those) who do not testify.161 Its only prohibition is
on the prosecutor’s argument or the judge’s instruction that the
jury may use the silence of the accused as evidence of guilt and
its only requirement is that the court give a cautionary instruction if requested.162 It does not prohibit the prosecutor from
responding to defense counsel’s argument that the prosecution
prevented defendant from telling his side of the story,163 or
from challenging the credibility of defendants who do testify.164
It does apply at judicial sentencing,165 but not in prison disciplinary proceedings.166 It is subject to harmless error analysis167
defendants chose trial over a plea bargain in the Middlesex Court of Common
Pleas).
161. According to one survey of 564 responding jurors in Florida, 38.6% reported that the defendant did not testify at trial. Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn
Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and the Presumption of Innocence:
In the Hands of Real Jurors, Is Either of Them Safe?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 237, 260, 263 (2006); Judge Friendly, an oft-cited critic of the privilege,
noted the “tremendous proportion of defendants [who] now testify” in stating
his conclusion not to recommend abandonment of the Griffin rule. Friendly,
supra note 119, at 700.
162. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (holding that “the Fifth
Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must give a ‘no-adverseinference’ jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so”).
163. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31 (1988) (holding that the
prosecution’s statements “in the light of the comments by defense counsel” did
not violate the Griffin rule); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595 (1978) (holding
that the prosecutor did not violate Griffin when he referred to the state’s evidence as “unrefuted” and “uncontradicted” since defense counsel “focused the
jury’s attention on her silence” by outlining the defense and stating that the
defendant would testify).
164. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 73 (2000) (upholding prosecutorial
comments on testifying defendant’s ability to tailor his testimony after hearing
other witnesses’ testimony); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980)
(holding that the court impeaching defendant’s testimony through reference to
a prearrest silence does not violate the Fifth Amendment).
165. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325 (1999) (“Where the sentence has not yet been imposed a defendant may have a legitimate fear of adverse consequences from further testimony.”).
166. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318–19 (1976) (“In criminal cases,
where the stakes are higher and the State’s sole interest is to convict, Griffin
prohibits the judge and prosecutor from suggesting to the jury that it may
treat the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt. Disciplinary proceedings in state prisons, however, involve the correctional process and important state interests other than conviction for crime. We decline to extend the
Griffin rule to this context.”).
167. Chapman v. United States, 386 U.S. 18, 25 (1967) (reversing conviction after finding error when the prosecutor drew inferences from the defendants silence to not be harmless). Also, note that the Court did not apply Griffin retroactively. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419
(1966).
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and, according to one study, Griffin reversals are rare.168
Whether overruling Griffin will meaningfully increase the instance of defendant testimony is at best uncertain.169 And, for
those defendants who continue to insist on remaining silent in
a post-Griffin world, the marginal gain in accuracy of those
verdicts depends on the evidential value of the adverse inference, which as mentioned above is probably not uniform across
cases.170
We also suspect that anti-Griffin arguments have overstated the need for, and accuracy-promoting benefits of, defendants’ testimony. The dissenters in neither Griffin nor Mitchell
complained about the loss of testimonial resources.171 There is
little reason to believe that overruling Griffin will increase the
rate of pretrial confessions, so the main incentivizing effect, if
any, will likely be to increase the rate of perjurious testimony
(especially if Making Defendants Speak’s recommendation to
abolish perjury enhancements172 is adopted), which hardly
seems an optimal way to promote accuracy.173 Overruling Grif168. Laurie L. Levenson, “Griffin” Errors, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 4, 2008, at 13
(finding that courts are reluctant to reverse a conviction unless there are egregious circumstances such as a prosecutor making “deliberate, not isolated”
statements).
169. For discussion of the difficulties in making the empirical case for incentivization, see Greer, supra note 88, at 720–23 (describing studies of
changes in the number of suspects remaining silent during police interrogation after enactment of PACE).
170. See supra notes 139–54 and accompanying text.
171. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332–33 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stressing the historical tradition that contrasts with the Griffin rule
and the strong intuitive inferences that are naturally drawn from silence);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 621–22 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(finding no disadvantage for the defendant with a prosecutorial comment versus “a court which permitted no comment at all” because it allows a “means of
articulating and bringing into the light of rational discussion a fact inescapably impressed on the jury’s consciousness”).
172. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1329 (“[C]ourts should not impose
perjury enhancements based on a defendant’s trial testimony.”).
173. Making Defendants Speak cites Olin Guy Wellborn III for the proposition that jurors do have “some ability to assess truthfulness based on the content of a witness’s statement” as opposed to demeanor. Sampsell-Jones, supra
note 1, at 1333 (citing Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1075, 1100–01 (1991)) (emphasis added). One obvious problem with this position is that, unlike experiments, jury trials do not isolate those two conditions.
Jurors are confronted with both demeanor and content evidence. In fact, in the
one study Wellborn cited for the content/demeanor distinction, researchers
asked participants which cues they looked to in evaluating credibility. Wellborn, supra, at 1084. The participants “cited mostly nonverbal cues”—that is,
unreliable demeanor evidence. Id. at 1084 –85. Making Defendants Speak also
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fin may also have the blunt-instrument effect of increasing the
attribution of guilt to the silent defendant whether logically
warranted or not. The rate of such attribution apparently is already high,174 as is the rate of misallocation of the burden of
proof.175 The remedy here would seem to be more clearly stated
jury instructions, not a dilution of Griffin’s protections.176
In our view, Making Defendants Speak would take matters
in the wrong direction. A much more promising set of reforms
would seek to reduce reliance on confessions and potentially
problematic defense testimony at trial and increase the availability and validity of other forms of evidence—both scientific
and nonscientific. One need not have succumbed to the “CSI Effect”177 to recognize that developments in forensic technologies
over the past several decades already have begun to offer some
forms of scientific evidence far more reliable than confession
claims “optimism” about jurors’ ability to distinguish truth from falsehood.
Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1333–34 (citing Bella M. DePaulo et al., The
Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception, 1 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346, 347 (1997)). DePaulo’s paper, however, is a metaanalysis of the literature concerning the relationship between confidence in
one’s judgments about truthfulness and the accuracy of those judgments, and
identifying moderators of that relationship. DePaulo, supra, at 346. As expected, “people’s confidence in their judgments of whether another person is
telling the truth or lying is not significantly related to the accuracy of those
judgments.” Id. at 353. Regarding the global issue of deception detection, DePaulo says, “[d]ozens of studies of the communication of deception provide
compelling evidence that people are not very skilled at distinguishing when
others are lying from when they are telling the truth.” Id. at 346. The bias
tends toward overconfidence: “[c]onfidence is not just uncorrelated with accuracy, it is sometimes substantially greater than accuracy.” Id. at 354. In other
words, “[d]eception detection is a very difficult task” at which people generally
do only slightly better than chance, yet in which people tend to overestimate
their accuracy. Id. at 346.
174. See Frank & Broschard, supra note 161, at 259–61 (showing a survey
where at least one out of five jurors disagreed with the fundamental protection).
175. See id. at 263–69 (finding that jurors, despite the court informing
them multiple times of the burden of proof, often consider a defendant’s silence in their deliberation).
176. See id. at 282 (“Jurors cannot, except by accident, follow their instructions unless they first understand them.”).
177. See Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing
Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1050 (2006)
(“The ‘CSI effect’ is a term that legal authorities and the mass media have
coined to describe a supposed influence that watching the television show CSI:
Crime Scene Investigation has on juror behavior. Some have claimed that jurors who see the high-quality forensic evidence presented on CSI raise their
standards in real trials, in which actual evidence is typically more flawed and
uncertain.”).
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evidence.178 For others, to be sure, acceptable levels of scientific
validity have yet to be achieved, and most forensic science is
dependent on the integrity of the protocols in the laboratories
that process it.179 But much greater gains in accuracy are likely
to be had by directly addressing these problems, as recently
recommended by the National Academies of Science,180 than by
overruling Griffin. With respect to other, nonscientific evidence—e.g., eyewitness evidence—there already is a rich and
growing literature regarding a number of investigative and legal reforms which, if implemented, would increase accuracy at
trial.181
Finally, we reply briefly to Making Defendants Speak’s
provocative suggestion that its rights-abolition proposal benefits defendants (the “participation, legitimacy, and equity” arguments182). Its proposal seeks to “punish” defendants for exercising their constitutional right to remain silent at trial by
178. Kenworthey Bilz, Self-Incrimination Doctrine is Dead; Long Live SelfIncrimination Doctrine: Confessions, Scientific Evidence, and the Anxieties of
the Liberal State, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 867–68 (2008) (concluding that
scientific evidence will continually improve until it becomes stronger than confessional self-incriminating evidence).
179. For an overview of the shortcomings within parts of the forensic
science community, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 109–10, 214
(2009) (detailing how disparities in funding and the lack of governance across
the forensic science community—particularly to produce standardized methodologies and procedures for certification and accreditation—throw the general
reliability of forensic science evidence at trial into question). The Court recognized some of the concerns with forensic science in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009), an opinion that strengthened rather
than weakened the adversary system.
180. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 179,
at 214 –15.
181. For an excellent resource for eyewitness evidence issues, see Gary
Wells’s Homepage, http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2009). For an overview, see Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, 53
U. ARK. L. REV. 231, 234, 236–37 (2000) (discussing the Department of Justice’s attempt to deal with mistaken eyewitness identifications by creating
guidelines and recommendations for lineup procedures); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 278, 280–
84 (2003) (revealing factors that affect eyewitness identification such as age,
environment, and confidence and discussing their importance); see also Richard S. Schmechel et al., 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 192 (2006) (studying and
discussing the average juror’s lack of knowledge concerning the reliability of
eyewitness testimony). See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN
THE LAW 369, 391 (2002) (reviewing the scientific and legal issues surrounding
eyewitness identification).
182. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1334 –38.
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empowering prosecutors to crow to juries about it (as the prosecutor in Griffin did) and thereby to pressure defendants into
enduring the hazards of testimony and cross-examination while
deliberately seeking to distance them from their counsel.183 We
fail to see how such results would enhance defendants’ perception of the legitimacy and fairness of the process. The restorative justice literature cited in Making Defendants Speak184—a
mode of corrections that involves diversion from the adversary
arena of court to arguably less dehumanizing, nonadversarial,
nonpunitive processes—does not support such a proposition.185
Nor does the Procedural Justice in Felony Cases study by Jonathan Casper and colleagues cited in Making Defendants
Speak.186 That study included items tapping the dimensions of
defendants’ sense of having the opportunity to express themselves in the process and interactions with counsel.187 Indeed,
the Casper study failed to find a relationship between a sense
of procedural justice and the mode of conviction (that is, whether convicted by guilty plea or by trial), but did find that “the
amount of time spent with the lawyer is positively related to
reports of procedural fairness.”188
Erica Hashimoto’s study of pro se felony defendants, also
cited in Making Defendants Speak,189 plainly does not support
the notion that pressuring defendants into distancing them-

183. Id. at 1337 (arguing that defendants would have better results if they
represented themselves and avoided “lower quality representation”).
184. Id. at 1335–36.
185. See Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice,
and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in
the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
553, 565 (2007) (failing to find that restorative justice [RJ] procedures more
successfully motivated adults to follow the law, but finding that RJ procedure
participants, as opposed to the traditional court trial, indicated that the law
was legitimate and that reoffending would create greater interpersonal problems); see also Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research
on the Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167,
182–86 (2003) (finding limited support for the conclusion that participants in
RJ programs were slightly more likely to believe they had been able to tell
their side of the story and to have their opinions adequately considered than
participants in court).
186. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1335 n.40.
187. Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 483, 484 (1988) (evaluating the influence of factors such as pretrial detention, plea bargaining, and other variables on the defendant’s satisfaction).
188. Id. at 497–98 (emphasis added).
189. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1335 n.40.
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selves from counsel is good for them.190 Hers is a carefully qualified defense of Faretta,191 not an assault on Gideon.192 To the
contrary, she explicitly warns, “[t]hat this small, self-selected
group who choose self-representation has met with adequate
results does not mean that all felony defendants, including
those who reject self-representation, would fare as well if forced
to navigate the criminal justice system without the aid of counsel. Thus, the right to counsel remains as important as when
the Court decided Gideon.”193 And, in our view, the solution to
the very real problem of inadequate defense counsel and
wealth-based disparities in representation is hardly the Harrison Bergeron-type approach of lowering the ceiling proposed by
Making Defendants Speak194—decreasing defendants’ reliance
on counsel by pressuring them to testify at trial. A more constructive approach is to look for ways to raise the floor.195
CONCLUSION
Making Defendants Speak complains that Griffin, like other Warren Court decisions in related areas, “lacked cogency and
analytical rigor.”196 It argues that if Griffin were to be overruled so that defendants might be made to speak, we would also improve accuracy in the judicial fact-finding process, and
enhance its legitimacy by encouraging defendants’ direct participation in their trials.197 Its more general project seems to be
not only to overrule Griffin, but to dilute the defendant’s position in the adversary system and to empower the government
by “allow[ing] prosecutors to argue adverse inferences from a
190. Erica H. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An
Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 487
(2007) (“[T]he right of self-representation in fact serves a vital role in protecting the rights of criminal defendants.”).
191. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (holding that defendants have the right to conduct their own defense).
192. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
193. Hashimoto, supra note 190, at 478.
194. KURT VONNEGUT, JR., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7–14 (1998).
195. For proposed reform based on advocacy norms of the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel, see Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System,
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 64 (1986) (advocating that the standard for effective counsel should be based on the concepts of due process and equal protection).
196. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 1, at 1342.
197. Id. at 1329–30.
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defendant’s silence”198 and by “reduc[ing] dependence on lawyers.”199 To establish a doctrinal foundation for this result, the
article asserts that a criminal trial is a “zero-sum,”200 “sorting
process” game.201 Thus stated, it becomes merely a matter of
adjusting the equation to bring about the desired outcome. Two
sets of reforms, two sets of adjustments to the judicial equation,
will make defendants speak: allow (even invite) inferences of
guilt from silence to punish defendants who choose to remain
silent; restrict the relevance of prior convictions as impeachment evidence and abolish obstruction-of-justice sentencing
guidelines enhancements to reward defendants who choose to
testify.
We have briefly noted why we believe Making Defendants
Speak’s purported benefits are illusory, but have concentrated
mainly on explaining why we do not share its apparent antipathy to the right to silence at trial. Griffin, like other opinions by
Justice Douglas late in his career, is vulnerable to criticism as
poor judicial craftsmanship,202 but we believe its principle is
sound. To be sure, that principle did not enjoy much currency
among the founders and it has been subject to continued academic criticism. Nevertheless, the no-adverse-inference rule
and the right to silence at trial it helps to effectuate have come
to be an integral part of an interrelated set of protections, arising within an increasingly complex and intrusive criminal justice system. Those protections accord a modicum of dignity we
believe most persons deserve when confronted by an inhuman
and powerful adversary in a dehumanizing process. Those protections recognize the central role of counsel as “a medium between the accused and the power of the State.”203 Today’s “test
the prosecution,” anti-inquisitorial model of criminal justice has
developed within an ever-burgeoning substantive criminal law
and law enforcement system. The particular rights at issue
here—the right to silence at trial and Griffin’s more specific
prohibition on the evidentiary use of its nonexercise against the
accused—is by now a well-established part of the cluster of
198. Id. at 1329.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1328.
201. Id. at 1330.
202. See Melvin I. Urofsky, William O. Douglas as a Common Law Judge,
41 DUKE L.J. 133, 134 (1991) (“William O. Douglas remains a figure surrounded by controversies concerned with his jurisprudence or lack of it.”).
203. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2098 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rights that define the model. That cluster may not look like it
did in the founders’ era, but then neither does much that matters about the practical, day-to-day face of our criminal law and
criminal justice system.204

204. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (recognizing that
“[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom”).

